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Student Thought and Classroom Language:
Examining the Mechanisms of Change
in Dialogic Teaching
Alina Reznitskaya and Maughn Gregory
Department of Educational Foundations
Montclair State University

Dialogue, as a communication form characterized by its commitment to inclusiveness and
rationality, has long been advocated by educators as a mechanism for helping students become
better thinkers. Unfortunately, numerous claims about the educational potential of participating
in dialogue have not resulted in substantial changes in classroom practices. Studies have
consistently shown that in today’s schools the dominant discourse remains largely monologic.
In this article, we present a testable theory of change that suggests how sociocultural processes
in a dialogic classroom influence students’ development. We identify and discuss three learning
outcomes of dialogic teaching, including epistemological understanding, argument skills, and
disciplinary knowledge. We then critically review empirical research related to the proposed
theory, highlighting unsolved questions, inconsistencies, and directions for future studies.
Finally, we focus on the implications of the proposed integrated theory and reviewed research
for teachers and their language use in a classroom.

For decades, educators have been captivated by the role classroom language plays in shaping students’ thinking (Cazden,
2001; Halliday, 1993; Vygotsky, 1981; Wells, 1999). Although language is increasingly seen as the primary mechanism for learning, not all communication patterns are considered to be equally effective, especially for promoting student behaviors at the higher levels of cognitive complexity.
Theorists and researchers have suggested that the true pedagogical value of a verbal exchange between teachers and
students lies in its dialogic organization (R. J. Alexander,
2005; Bakhtin, 1984; Freire, 1993; Mead, 1962; Nystrand,
Wu, Gamoran, Zeiser, & Long, 2003). When explaining the
meaning of genuine dialogue, Bakhtin (1984) distinguished
it from “monologism, which pretends to possess a readymade truth” (p. 110). In monologic teaching, “someone who
knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 81). In contrast,
in a dialogic classroom “truth . . . is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic
interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 110). In a similar way, though
in more political terms, Freire (1993) diagnosed monologic
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education as “suffering from narration sickness,” typified by
the teacher whose “task is to ‘fill’ the students with the contents of his narration” (p. 52). He famously referred to this
kind of pedagogy as “the ‘banking’ concept of education, in
which the scope of action allowed to the students extends
only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits” (p.
53). Freire proposed an alternative model of “problem-posing
education [that] regards dialogue as indispensable to the act
of cognition” (p. 64).
Broadly defined, dialogic teaching is a pedagogical approach that involves students in the collaborative construction of meaning and is characterized by shared control over
the key aspects of classroom discourse (R. J. Alexander,
2008; Burbules, 1993; Freire, 1993; Webb et al., 2007). Many
educational theorists have advocated for a more widespread
use of dialogic teaching (Burbules, 1993; Gregory, 2004;
Lipman, 1988; Paul, 1986; Wells, 2000). There is also emerging empirical evidence to indicate its potential to help students develop higher order thinking and deeper understanding of subject-matter knowledge (Murphy, Soter, Wilkinson,
Hennessey, & Alexander, 2009; Reznitskaya et al., 2009;
Schwarz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000; Wegerif, Mercer, &
Dawes, 1999). Nevertheless, the predominant mode of classroom communication today remains monologic rather than
dialogic (R. J. Alexander, 2005; Mehan, 1998; Nystrand et al.,
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2003). In a recent observational study of 64 middle school
and high school English classrooms in five states (Applebee,
Langer, Nystrand, & Gamoran, 2003), researchers found that
the average amount of time spent on dialogic discussions was
only 1.7 min per 60-min class. Instead of engaging students
in a dialogue, many teachers continue to control both the
content and the form of classroom communication by choosing questions and topics, nominating student speakers, and
correcting their answers. In many contemporary classrooms,
“teachers rather than learners do most of the talking” (R. J.
Alexander, 2005, p. 2). When students speak, they are often
required “to report on someone else’s thinking, rather than to
think for themselves.” They are then “judged on their accuracy or compliance in doing so. . . . This script is remarkably
resistant to efforts to transform it” (R. J. Alexander, 2005,
p. 2).
Thus, there exists a disparity between the endorsed educational ideal of dialogic teaching and the reality of typical classroom practice. In the effort to support advocated
changes in classroom communication, we present a comprehensive theoretical model that clarifies the relationships
between dialogue, teaching, and learning. In formulating
our theory, we have drawn upon diverse academic fields,
including the literatures in philosophy of education, cognitive science, educational psychology, epistemology, and the
study of argumentation (e.g., Burbules, 1993; Flavell, 1985;
Freire, 1993; Keefer, Zeitz, & Resnick, 2000; Kuhn, 1991;
Nystrand et al., 2003; Vygotsky, 1968; Walton, 1998). By integrating schema-theoretic and sociocultural perspectives on
learning, our model explains how students develop their epistemological understanding, argument skills, and disciplinary
knowledge through engaging in a dialogic interaction with
others. Through articulating the mechanisms of change in a
dialogic classroom and connecting them to specific new competencies to be acquired by students, we hope to stimulate
more theory-driven studies of dialogic teaching that can inform instructional choices of practitioners. We also critically
review existing empirical evidence related to the proposed
theoretical principles, pointing out unsolved questions and
problems that require more attention from researchers. Finally, we discuss suggestions for supporting teachers’ use of
dialogic practices in their classrooms.

INQUIRY DIALOGUE
Definition and Assumptions
Following Burbules (1993), we define dialogue as “a continuous, developmental, communicative interchange through
which [participants] stand to gain a fuller appreciation of the
world, [themselves], and one another” (p. 8). Different types
of dialogue can be used to achieve different goals (Burbules,
1993; Keefer et al., 2000; Walton, 1998), and this article focuses on teaching through inquiry dialogue. Inquiry dialogue
is initiated by an open question, and its main goal is to collec-
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tively formulate reasonable judgments, adding to a group’s
existing body of knowledge and mutual understanding (Walton & Macagno, 2007). Although the term persuasion has
also been used to denote similar uses of reasoned discourse
(e.g., P. A. Alexander, Fives, Buehl, & Mulhern, 2002), the
word inquiry may be more appropriate based on the distinction proposed by Walton (1992). According to Walton,
persuasion dialogue is focused on convincing someone to
accept a given position, whereas inquiry dialogue is a collaborative attempt to reach a sound conclusion. This difference
in goals is important because it may affect normative protocols (i.e., rules of what is considered appropriate in the
dialogue), the standards used to evaluate the strength of proposed arguments, and the pedagogical approaches to teaching
argumentation (Nussbaum, 2011; Walton, 1992).
To effectively use inquiry dialogue in a classroom, teachers, and eventually their students, need to develop views of
knowledge and knowing that are congruent with this pedagogical approach (Kuhn & Crowell, 2011; Windschitl, 2002).
Specifically, dialogic teaching and learning requires an underlying commitment to rational thinking as a mechanism for
formulating better judgments. Researchers have proposed
a variety of models to account for people’s conceptions of
knowledge and knowing, or personal epistemology (Hofer,
2001; Schraw, 2001). Generally, people progress from a simple view of knowledge as static and possessed by authorities
to a more advanced understanding of knowledge as socially
constructed through the use of reasoning (Hofer, 2001). In
this article, we rely on a useful classification of individual theories of knowledge proposed by Kuhn (1991), who described
three hierarchically ordered stages of epistemological development: absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist.
Absolutists view knowledge as fixed and existing independently of human cognition. Experts know the truth, which is
certain and proven by hard facts. Dewey (1988) dubbed this
view “the spectator theory of knowledge” and critiqued it
both for its underlying theory of reality as unchanging and
for its misconstrual of knowing as a kind of detached seeing or beholding, rather than an active interaction with the
world (p. 163). At the next stage, multiplists see knowledge
as entirely subjective, devaluing the use of shared rules of
knowledge justification and the legitimacy of expertise. For
multiplists, experts are as fallible as laypeople, and there are
no established methods that can help us to judge the soundness of different arguments or to reconcile opposing opinions.
In Kuhn’s (1992) research, participants at multiplist stage
maintained that “everyone has his own point of view” and
that “they’re opinions, and you can’t disprove them” (p. 184).
Representing the most advanced stage, evaluativists accept
that there is a subjective dimension to knowledge. However,
they also recognize that certain methods of inquiry guard
against certain kinds of biases and errors; that it is possible
to engage in a rational evaluation of different viewpoints; and
that, as a result, we ought to consider some judgments to be
more defensible than others. It is important to note that there
are critics of rationality, who do not accept the privileging of
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the evaluativist epistemology. However, arguing for our commitment to the evaluativist position is beyond the scope of
this article. For an insightful discussion of this topic, please
refer to Terry Eagleton’s (2003) chapter “Truth, Virtue and
Objectivity.”
Multiplist and absolutist epistemologies are incompatible
with dialogic teaching. In the words of Bakhtin (1984), “both
relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all argumentation,
all authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary . . . or
impossible (p. 69). Despite their differences, both multiplists
and absolutists rely on fundamentally monologic assumptions about knowledge: They either discount a possibility of
shared understanding or insist on an absolute truth (Sidorkin,
1999). Multiplists would fail to appreciate the value of inquiry dialogue in a classroom because they see knowledge
as entirely relative and idiosyncratic. Likewise, absolutists
would see no need for engaging in collective knowledge construction and critique because they believe that only authority figures have legitimate knowledge. Thus, it is evaluativist
epistemology that provides for a suitable context for using
inquiry dialogue in teaching. In an evaluativist classroom,
teachers and, gradually, their students come to see knowledge
as “the product of a continuing process of examination, comparison, evaluation, and judgment of different, sometimes
competing, explanations and perspectives” (Kuhn, 1991,
p. 202).
Notably, evaluativist views depart significantly from the
core assumptions about knowledge and learning that have
shaped Western schooling (Windschitl, 2002). Instead, traditional instruction reflects behaviorist and absolutist conceptions. Knowledge is transmitted to learners by authority
figures through the unambiguous use of language. Learning
involves passively and unselectively receiving and reproducing knowledge known by experts in its original, objective
form. According to Freire (1993), this tradition assumes that
“knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to
know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others
. . . negates education and knowledge as a process of inquiry”
(p. 53). These assumptions are manifested in contemporary
schools through a familiar recitation sequence, which has
been well documented and criticized as the prevalent mode
of classroom communication (e.g., R. J. Alexander, 2008;
Alvermann, O’Brien, & Dillon, 1990; Henning & Lockhart,
2003; Mehan, 1998; Nystrand et al., 2003; Onosko, 1990).
During recitation, teachers initiate and control all communication. Students speak only to respond to “test” questions, recalling basic, often disconnected bits of information. Student
responses are then evaluated by the teacher, whose authority
cannot be questioned and who serves as the only source of
right answers.
In contrast, dialogic teaching embodies sociocultural and
constructivist theories of learning and reflects evaluativist
epistemology (e.g., Anderson, 1977; Mead, 1962; Piaget &
Inhelder, 1969; Vygotsky, 1962; Wertsch & Bivens, 1992).

According to these perspectives, students are viewed as active
meaning makers who learn through constructing and negotiating new understandings in interaction-rich communities
of practice. In addition to the development of subject-matter
knowledge, the goals of schooling include the appropriation
of intellectual dispositions that underlie the construction of
disciplinary expertise.
Social and Interactional Practices in a Dialogic
Classroom
What should be happening in a dialogic classroom? Although
various programs and practices have evolved, some of which
describe dialogic teaching somewhat differently, there are key
distinguishing characteristics that consistently appear across
multiple accounts (e.g., Burbules, 1993; Lipman, 1988; Mercer & Littleton, 2007; Nystrand et al., 2003; Paul, 1986;
Scott, Mortimer, & Aguiar, 2006; Wells, 2000; Wilkinson,
Reninger, & Soter, 2010). First, in dialogic teaching power relations are flexible, and responsibilities for the form and content of talk are shared among group members. Classrooms are
transformed into learning communities, where participants
meet on terms of equality and take on key roles in navigating
class communication: They ask questions, participate in turn
management, and evaluate one another’s answers (Sharp &
Splitter, 1995). “The . . . teacher loses the position of external
boss or dictator, but takes on that of leader of group activities” (Dewey, 1967, p. 59). As teachers in a dialogic discussion strategically support disciplined inquiry into contestable
questions, they “treat students as potential sources of knowledge and opinion, and in so doing complicate expert-novice
hierarchies” (Nystrand et al., 2003, p. 140). It is important to
note that such a view of teacher–student relations does not
dismiss the authority of a teacher as a more knowledgeable
partner in a discussion. Burbules (1993) argued that acknowledging authority based on one’s expertise or experience does
not necessarily threaten the egalitarian nature of interactions
and, instead, helps to enhance the intellectual rigor of inquiry.
He explained,
authority in the context of dialogical relation can have legitimacy, based neither on institutionalized roles and privileges
nor on unexamined assumptions about expertise. Nor need it
be seen as a static possession of one partner. . . . Rather, authority should be viewed as growing out of on-going communicative interchange that acknowledges differences in knowledge, experience, or ability without reifying them. (p. 34)

One aspect of this communicative interchange is that students come to understand their teacher’s mastery of a subject
as resulting from her own participation in another, professional community (i.e., of mathematicians, historians, or biologists). This understanding grounds but also qualifies the
teacher’s content expertise. Students see her, on one hand, as
a professional who can guide, inform, and at times correct
their own inquiries but also, on the other hand, as someone
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whose own expertise is limited, and who is in a position
to recognize innovative methods and answers the students
generate (Gregory, 2002).
Second, dialogic teaching centers around questions that
are “fundamentally open or divergent . . . in terms of allowing a broader degree of uncertainty in what would constitute
an adequate answer” (Burbules, 1993, p. 97; see also Lefstein,
2010; Splitter & Sharp, 1996). The purpose of open-ended
questions is neither to test students nor to simply lead them to
a narrow range of answers deemed acceptable by the teacher.
Rather, these questions invite students to take part in a disciplinary inquiry—a higher pedagogical goal. They “problematize, or transform commonly accepted facts or answers
into problems to be explored, thereby opening knowledge to
thinking” (Lefstein, 2010, p. 176). It is important to note that
open-ended questions can inspire meaningful inquiry, even
when students are learning the subjects with “already known”
answers, such as physics or math. The widely accepted facts
and principles in various disciplines have evolved through
ongoing dialogue in academic communities, whose members
challenged, supported, and complimented one another’s work
(Longino, 1990). Similarly, a classroom community “should
treat all questions asked and answers offered as grist for further inquiry, even when someone claims, perhaps justifiably,
to ‘know the answer’“ (Splitter & Sharp, 1996, p. 300). In
this way, students learn to appreciate the public, contestable,
and evolving nature of disciplinary knowledge, or, in other
words, acquire more sophisticated epistemologies. As argued
by Dewey (1933), teaching subjects to students by presenting a logically ordered sequence of established facts creates
a false impression of how inquiry in any field actually happens. Moreover, it robs students of the chance to experience
the kind of thinking that underlies disciplinary expertise. This
is why the emphasis in a dialogic classroom is on “the activity of knowing” (Wells, 1999). Students are not expected to
“reinvent the wheel,” but to experience, resolve, and enjoy
at least some of the intellectual challenges of the original
inventors. As students publically share their thinking about a
contestable question, they
are bound to present a diversity of views on almost any
topic they are invited to investigate. This diversity must be
reflected in the inquiry process if those involved are expected
to own, and value, whatever conclusions are reached. . . . The
members of a genuine community of inquiry will rightly
be swayed by what is said, and by reasons offered for and
against, but they will not be swayed by the fact that it is the
teacher who said it. (Splitter & Sharp, 1996, p. 300)

Thus, the use of open-ended questions supports the egalitarian nature of interactions and helps to engage students
in higher order thinking (Burbules, 1993; Splitter & Sharp,
1996). It facilitates the kind of genuine inquiry that allows
students to develop more reasonable and personally meaningful judgments, as they base these judgments on the rela-
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tive strengths of arguments proposed by their peers and the
teacher during group discussions.
Third, dialogic inquiry is inherently metacognitive, in that
it requires the group to engage in ongoing “cognitive activity
that takes as its object” both the products and the processes
of interaction (Flavell, 1985, p. 104). Metacognition includes
the awareness of the content of one’s and others’ thinking and
the ability to monitor and regulate thought processes in ways
that support and improve performance (Kuhn & Dean, 2004).
For example, a student in a dialogic discussion may ask his
peer to clarify a vague remark. This request implies that the
student has an insight into his own level of understanding
(i.e., “I don’t get this”) and a “compensatory strategy” that
serves to remedy the situation, improving the learning experience of the individual and the group.
The teacher in a dialogic classroom has an important role
of modeling and encouraging metacognition by helping students pay attention to the quality of their reasoning (Gregory,
2007; Waggoner, Chinn, Yi, & Anderson, 1995). The use of
metacognitive strategies transforms a directionless conversation into an inquiry, during which the participants’ thinking
moves toward reasonable judgments. In a dialogic classroom,
teachers are “substantively weak” but “procedurally strong”
(Kennedy, 2004; Splitter & Sharp, 1996). They purposefully
assume the position of “scholarly ignorance,” refraining from
posturing as having all the right answers or from directly
supplying answers to students (Splitter & Sharp, 1996). This
means that instead of correcting erroneous conclusions proposed by the students, teachers will engage their students in
the reflection on the inquiry process used to arrive at these
conclusions.
The emphases in dialogic classrooms on open-ended versus known-information questions and on processes versus
products of thinking do not necessarily imply a dichotomy
between teaching students how to think versus what to think
(Harpaz, 2007). Through collectively engaging in inquiry dialogue, students eventually formulate conclusions that are
“most reasonable by account of all available arguments
and evidence” (Gregory, 2006). These conclusions represent the products of dialogic teaching. During inquiry dialogue, student misconceptions, gaps in knowledge, and flaws
in reasoning become visible to the group and are “put to
the test of public accountability” (Gregory, 2006). Sohmer,
Michaels, O’Connor, and Resnick (2009) discussed three
facets of public accountability, including “accountability
to learning community, knowledge, and rigorous thinking”
(p. 106). Accountability to knowledge, for example, “demands knowledge that is accurate and relevant to the issue
under discussion” (p. 106). Thus, the dialogic process guards
against errors in substantive conclusions, as the group continually self-corrects by using the methods of inquiry suitable
for a given discipline (Gregory, 2006). P. A. Alexander et
al. (2002) described a symbiotic relationship between the
processes and products of inquiry, suggesting that “critical
thinking and reasoning are . . . essential processes that allow
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for the internalization of domain-specific knowledge and exploration of related beliefs. Reciprocally, the activation of
domain knowledge and beliefs fuels students’ critical thinking and reasoning” (p. 796).

In the course of further social activity, the individual externalizes the process that she has appropriated in behavior that
is novel in the situation and which, as a result, may transform
the way in which situation is understood by other members
of the culture. (p. 43)

THEORETICAL MODEL OF DIALOGIC
TEACHING AND LEARNING

For example, a student who has, through observation and
practice, become skilled at giving counterexamples may then
offer a unique counterexample that did not or would not occur
to others in the class.
Relating sociocultural theories to dialogic teaching, we
suggest that participation in inquiry dialogue with others offers an external arena where students can practice using the
tools of rational and collective thinking and eventually transform them into individual psychological functions through
the process of internalization. Stressing the connection between public and private thinking, Mead (1962) argued that
individual reasoning is a process of internal argumentation,
a dialogue with a “generalized other” (p. 156). Similarly,
Bakhtin (1986) wrote that “our thought itself . . . is born and
shaped in interaction and struggle with other’s thought, and
this cannot but be reflected in the forms that verbally express
our thoughts as well” (p. 92). Thus, collaborative engagement in inquiry dialogue makes thinking processes visible to
group members, supporting the development of rationality
in individuals.
As class participants collectively formulate, defend, and
scrutinize each other’s viewpoints, they begin to appropriate general intellectual dispositions and specific linguistic
skills of reasoned argumentation, which they can use whenever they need to resolve complex issues. In other words,
dialogic discussions offer students a kind of apprenticeship,
during which the principles of disciplined inquiry, first practiced among peers (i.e., social, intermental plane), become
part of one’s cognitive functioning (i.e., individual intramental plane). Just like pebbles in the ocean that rub against
each other and, in the process, change their original shapes,
students polish their abilities to engage in rational argumentation, as they encounter new language and thought practices
during their interactions with peers. This process is reciprocal: As students advance their knowledge and skills, they
influence the functioning of the class, thus prompting a new
cycle of individual and group transformations.
To further clarify essential learning outcomes acquired
by individual students as a result of their engagement in
inquiry dialogue with others, we rely on constructivist approaches, in particular, schema theory (e.g., Anderson, 1977;
Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). Schema theory proposes that
knowledge can be represented as generic mental structures,
or schemas. Learning involves generation and modification
of these schemas, and successful transfer entails accessing
and applying relevant abstract structures (Gick & Holyoak,
1987; Reed, 1993). To describe one of the key outcomes
of dialogic teaching, we suggest that through consistent engagement in inquiry, dialogue students come to recognize

In this section, we present a theoretical model that explains
how teaching and learning happen in a dialogic classroom.
We now focus on the hypothesized psychological mechanisms, deferring the discussion of the empirical evidence for
the proposed theories to the subsequent sections.
Learning Processes and Outcomes
When explaining general mechanisms of learning, sociocultural theorists call attention to the priority “in time and in
fact” of social interaction in individual development (Luria,
1981; Wells, 1999). Learning occurs through “the mastery
of devices of cultural behavior and thinking” (Vygotsky &
Luria, as cited in Wertsch & Tulviste, 1992, p. 551). Students
need to encounter and use these devices, or “cultural tools,”
to augment their mental capacities. Language is the “tool
of tools” that not only facilitates interaction but also fundamentally transforms individual cognition (Cole & Wertsch,
1996). “When children learn language, they are not simply
engaging in one type of learning among many: rather, they
are learning the foundations of learning itself ” (Halliday,
1993, p. 93).
As individuals engage in the “process of making meaning
with others,” they get to experience and, gradually, appropriate various cultural tools (Wells, 1999). Students change
their mental structures, as they internalize “the resources of
the culture” from a social, external, plane to an individual,
internal plane (Wells, 1999). For instance, a student who
says something vague in a discussion will at first only recognize that vagueness when someone else in the classroom
community pushes her for clarification. Eventually the student anticipates this reaction from her peers and self-edits
her ideas before communicating them to the group. What
began as interpersonal interaction becomes an intrapersonal
cognitive habit.
Importantly, internalized knowledge is not simply a duplicate of external social patterns (Wertsch & Bivens, 1992).
According to Vygotsky (1981), “it goes without saying that
internalization transforms the process itself and changes its
structure and functions” (p. 163). This implies that learners
will actively and selectively construct new meanings based
on their existing understandings about the world. Further,
as learners change their thinking, they, in turn, contribute
in new ways to the construction of the group’s knowledge
(Wells, 1999). Wells (1999) explained this cyclical pattern of
individual and group development as follows:
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important commonalities in their experiences and, as a result, develop an internal abstract knowledge structure we call
an argument schema (Reznitskaya et al., 2008). To specify
the elements involved in an argument schema, we draw upon
the normative models proposed by argumentation scholars
(e.g., Toulmin, 1958; Walton, 1996a). In an influential book,
Toulmin (1958) suggested a model of a rational argument, pioneering the effort to define nonoverlapping functions of the
premises, including a data, a warrant, and a qualifier. Other
theorists expanded Toulmin’s model to incorporate additional
elements, such as a counterargument (Walton, 1996a).
Most systems of argumentation and informal logic distinguish the form of the argument from the truth value of its
premises—a distinction first noted by Aristotle (Ross, 1952).
The distinction is necessary to the operation of logic, but misleading, if it is taken to imply that the truth value of premises
can be arrived at independently of rational (argumentative)
inquiry. The premises of literary interpretation are supported
by details in the text, the premises of legal arguments are
established by witness or expert testimony, the premises in
historical arguments are justified by reference to historical
documents and artifacts, and the premises of scientific arguments are supported through the collection and analysis of
data. But in all these cases, unless undisputed or stipulated,
the truth value of premises must be justified, and justification is another instance of inquiry. Indeed, it is precisely in
episodes of inquiry dialogue that doubt may arise regarding
premises formerly taken for granted. When the logic of an
argument seems unassailable, but its conclusion appears unacceptable or counterintuitive, the only recourse is to become
suspicious of the truth value of the premise. Understanding
the standards of evidence used to develop the premises of an
argument is thus another important element in a sophisticated
argument schema.
The concept of an argument schema was further developed
by Anderson et al. (2001), who proposed that argumentative
knowledge can be analyzed at the level of metacognitive
language structures, called argument stratagems. Argument
stratagems are inquiry moves that help one to progress toward
sound judgments. These language structures represent “tools
of wide application” (Carey, 1985) and can serve a variety of
functions, such as introducing a counterargument, questioning the source of information used as evidence, acknowledging uncertainty, or inviting a classmate to speak. According
to Anderson et al. (2001), students in a dialogic discussion
“appropriate an argument stratagem when they judge that
the stratagem is a useful tool for advancing understanding or
adding to the persuasive force of an argument” (p. 4). For example, during the discussion, participants may use phrases,
such as, “Some people might say . . .” or “Someone may
disagree because . . .” to suggest an opposing point of view
overlooked by the group. We can label this stratagem with
the general form, “Some people might say [COUNTERARGUMENT].” The capitalized, bracketed part of the stratagem
will change in response to contextually different scenarios.
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However, the underlying function and possible consequences
will remain the same (Anderson et al., 2001).
The concept of a schema has been employed previously in
research on argumentation and reasoning (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1982; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Walton, 1996b).
For example, Walton (1996b) used the term argumentation
schemes to analyze several types of inferences that appear
in everyday argumentative discourse, including arguments
from expert opinion, example, analogy, and so on. Other researchers (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) employed the notion
of pragmatic reasoning schemas to describe context-specific
psychological mechanisms that account for typical responses
to conditional reasoning tasks. Researchers in writing and
reading have used the term to represent a global structure
of argumentative text (e.g., Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1982).
The concept of an argument schema we propose is broader
than the previously outlined notions because it incorporates
both the knowledge of logical principles and standards of
evidence, as well as metacognitive aspects of reasoning. In
addition, it emphasizes the social nature of argumentation,
where individual arguments are modeled after public discourse and represent “internalized conversations” with others
(Mead, 1962).
Our theory further assumes that it is possible to postulate
general, “field-invariant” characteristics of an argument. Although different knowledge domains (i.e., moral, scientific,
legal) have their own specialized procedures of investigation,
rules of evidence, and standards of reasonableness (Toulmin,
1958), we agree with Dewey (1938) that inquiry, understood
as the search for reasonable belief, has the general structure of
generating hypotheses in response to well-formed questions
and testing those hypotheses with evidence and arguments
in order to arrive at the most reasonable conclusions. For instance, the stratagem of arguing against a proposition because
it leads to an unacceptable consequence can be generalized,
even though what counts as unacceptable will be domain
specific, for example, morally reprehensible, contradicted by
factual evidence, or in violation of a precedent. Further, even
“field-dependent” rules of argumentation can be generalized
across multiple contexts within a disciplinary domain. Thus,
we can think of an argument schema as an aggregation of both
general and field-specific reasoning structures, standards, and
stratagems. Because this knowledge of argumentation is abstract, learners should be able to show positive transfer to new
situations—both within and among domains. Just like entering a new restaurant activates “a restaurant schema” (Schank
& Abelson, 1977) abstracted from multiple prior experiences
with ordering, eating, and paying for food, a situation that
calls for forming a judgment should trigger a set of cognitive and metacognitive practices that constitute an argument
schema.
Separate common elements of an argument schema and
their relationships are supported by a set of beliefs, which
constitutes an “explanatory framework” (Mishra & Brewer,
2003) for the schema. An explanatory framework is the
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underlying, higher order mental structure that “glues together” pieces of information, which otherwise would remain
unrelated or acausal (Mishra & Brewer, 2003). Following
Kuhn (1999), a developed argument schema is supported by
an epistemic model that recognizes the function and value
of a rational argument as a means for choosing among alternative propositions or actions. Thus, an evaluativist epistemology provides the normative explanatory framework. In
other words, individual argument schemas are more likely to
be activated, accessed, and applied during a reasoning task
if the learners have progressed to the evaluativist level of
epistemological development. In a similar way, Kuhn (1999)
suggested that advanced levels of epistemology are essential
for engagement in argumentation, as they provide reasons
for actually using the skills of argument when solving illstructured problems.
Consequently, evaluativist epistemology is both the necessary context for dialogic teaching and an important learning
outcome for the students. To explain how students develop
their epistemologies through discussion, we again draw on
the radical proposals of Vygotsky and others (Luria, 1981;
Vygotsky, 1968; Wells, 1999), which state that language is
not just a medium for articulating ideas, but it is an essential mechanism for forming new ways of thinking and
knowing. When students deliberate about complex questions
in a dialogic discussion, they encounter multiple and often competing lines of reasoning, characterized by different
logical moves and related evidence (Paul, 1986). For example, the same fact of a story character firing a gun can be
interpreted by different students as an attack or as an act
of self-defense and then used to support alternative viewpoints. In a dialogic classroom, the merits of various arguments are evaluated in a public forum, as class members
hold each other accountable to the shared standards of reasoning and evidence (Gregory, 2006; Paul, 1986; Sohmer
et al., 2009). Students learn that their own views, as well
as the opposing views of their peers, can be defended, defeated, or reconstructed using general principles of argumentation. This engagement in collective negotiation of alternative claims helps students to advance their epistemological
beliefs. Students begin to see that knowledge is not simply handed down by authority figures (i.e., absolutist level).
They also realize that not all viewpoints can equally withstand the scrutiny of rigorous public accountability (i.e., multiplist level). As students internalize the idea that knowledge
claims can be judged based on the strength of arguments
used to support them, they progress to evaluativist level of
epistemology.
Functions of Argument Schemas
Research on schematic structures has identified important
influences of a developed schema on perception, comprehension, learning, inferencing, and remembering (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Cham-

bliss, 1995; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Reed, 1993). Generalizing from this research, the functions of an argument
schema should include facilitating argument comprehension, construction, and evaluation (Reznitskaya et al., 2008).
Also, because argumentation supports knowledge creation
in a variety of academic disciplines, argument schemas
will affect student learning and performance across different school subjects, including language arts, science, and
math (Alrø & Skovsmose, 2000; Duschl & Osborne, 2002;
Kuhn, 2010; Reznitskaya et al., 2008). As students engage
in collaborative inquiry, formulating, supporting, and challenging multiple interpretations, they acquire deeper, more
complex disciplinary expertise. For example, students build
more nuanced interpretation of a story character in a reading class, gain more sophisticated perspective on totalitarian societies in a history class, or develop deeper understanding of the concept of negative numbers in a math
class.
Let us consider, for example, how students with developed argument schemas will respond to a task that calls for
expressing an opinion on a controversial topic in a persuasive
essay. To start, students’ cognitive behavior will be guided by
an evaluativist epistemological stance “that treats argument
as worthwhile, as a fundamental path to knowing” (Kuhn,
1991, p. 201). According to Govier (1987), such a mind-set
is
illusive to many not encouraged to think about reasoning,
argumentation, and the justification of claims. It is the sense
that reasoning is going on, that there is an inference made
from some propositions to others, and that this inference can
be critically scrutinized. (p. 233)

This mind-set, along with the epistemological understanding
of the requirements for knowledge justification, will help students to interpret the persuasive essay task as an example of
unresolved inquiry, thus activating their argument schemas.
Students will then proceed to make use of relevant “slots” in
the schema. For example, students can be expected to articulate the main claim and support it with reasons. They will
rely on a variety of argument stratagems that they have acquired from participation in inquiry dialogue, during which
group members were held accountable to rigorous standards
of reasoning and evidence. For example, students might introduce an opposing position in their essays with “Some people
might say [COUNTERARGUMENT].” The general form of
this stratagem and its function—an objection proposed by an
imagined “someone”—would have been learned from prior
experience with inquiry dialogue. As explained by Anderson
et al. (2001), “thinkers must hear several voices within their
own heads representing contrasting perspectives on an issue.
The ability and disposition to take more than one perspective arises from participating in discussions with others who
hold different perspectives” (p. 2). Note that the effective use
of the stratagem requires a metalevel awareness that one’s
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LEARNING PROCESSES
Teacher Evaluativist Epistemology

Inquiry dialogue that features:
•
•
•

Shared control over communications
Collective inquiry into contestable
questions
Use of metacognitive tools

Transferrable Individual Outcomes

Transferrable Group Outcomes

1. Evaluativist Epistemology
2. Argument Schemas
• Knowledge of logical structures
• Knowledge of standards of evidence
• Argument stratagems
3. More complex understanding of
disciplinary knowledge

1. Evaluativist Epistemology
2. Argument Schemas
• Knowledge of logical structures
• Knowledge of standards of evidence
• Argument stratagems
3. More complex understanding of
disciplinary knowledge

FIGURE 1

Theoretical model of teaching and learning through inquiry dialogue.

thinking about a given topic may be different from that of
“some people.” We suggest that this stratagem prompts students to come up with opposing perspectives that may not
have been voiced otherwise. It also provides students with an
effective means by which to incorporate counterarguments
in their essays.
To summarize, our theoretical model, shown in Figure 1,
accounts for learning processes and outcomes in a dialogic classroom for both individual students and a classroom
community. Teachers with evaluativist epistemology create
the necessary context for inquiry dialogue, supporting the
use of normative participatory and discursive practices by
classroom members. These practices include shared control
over group communication, focus on collective inquiry into
open-ended questions, and the use of metacognitive tools
that help to regulate both processes and products of inquiry
dialogue.
In a dialogic classroom, the capacities of the teacher and
more advanced students become distributed among other
members of the group, who observe, practice, and gradually internalize new ways of speaking and thinking. In other
words, students transform interpersonal, external relations
into intrapersonal mental functions, thus building their intellectual capacities. We have identified three transferrable
learning outcomes in a dialogic classroom. First, participation in inquiry dialogue helps students develop beliefs about

knowledge and knowing that are consistent with evaluativist epistemology. Evaluativist epistemology supports the
activation and use of an argument schema, another outcome of dialogic teaching. A developed argument schema
includes the knowledge of logical structures, standards of
evidence, and stratagems useful in argumentation. Because
schemas are abstract, they can be generalized across multiple contexts. Thus, students in dialogic classrooms should
perform better on argument-related tasks that they encounter
outside the dialogic circle. Third, by engaging in a collaborative inquiry in a variety of academic disciplines, such
as reading, science, and math, students acquire more complex, nuanced, and personally meaningful disciplinary knowledge. Notably, in a dialogic classroom, not only are the
three learning outcomes—evaluativist epistemology, argument schemas, and disciplinary knowledge—developed parallel to one another but each contributes to, and reinforces,
the development of the others. Finally, in a cyclical process
of individual and group transformations, students with more
developed epistemologies, argument schemas, and substantive knowledge act to enhance the quality of inquiry dialogue
in the collective. In other words, as members of a classroom community become more advanced in their intellectual
capacities, they contribute new thought and language practices to group discussions, thus stimulating new rounds of
development.
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RESEARCH ON DIALOGIC TEACHING
AND LEARNING
Features of Dialogic Classrooms
We begin the discussion of the empirical case for dialogic
teaching by focusing on one aspect of the proposed theoretical framework that has been extensively studied by researchers, that is, typical patterns of interactions in dialogic
classrooms. There is now a substantial body of evidence that
describes verbal and social practices characteristic of inquiry
dialogue (e.g., R. J. Alexander, 2003; Almasi, O’Flahavan,
& Arya, 2001; Applebee et al., 2003; Billings & Fitzgerald, 2002; Chinn, Anderson, & Waggoner, 2001; Mercer
& Littleton, 2007; Nystrand et al., 2003; Onosko, 1990;
Reznitskaya et al., 2012; Soter et al., 2008; Taylor, Pearson,
Peterson, & Rodriguez, 2003). For example, Billings and
Fitzgerald (2002) used open and focused coding of videotaped classroom discussions to analyze consistent patterns of
talk and identify important social relationships. Specifically,
they evaluated the amount and distribution of talk, examined its purposes and functions (i.e., statement vs. question,
different types of questions), and characterized participation formats (i.e., who initiated a topic and what followed).
Using multiple data sources, including videotaped discussions, questionnaires, and interviews, the authors also distinguished among different roles of teachers and students. In
another study by Chinn and Anderson (1998), the authors
constructed “an argument network diagram” of student and
teacher turns. The diagram allowed researchers to evaluate
the quality of interactions on a variety of dimensions, including the breadth of arguments developed by the participants,
the level of elaboration and explicitness, and the amount of
collaboration among participants. In addition to substantive
findings, these studies contributed important methodological
knowledge that can help future researchers and practitioners
to engage in a systematic study of communication as it happens in a classroom. Several recent publications summarized
and critically reviewed various methodological approaches,
highlighting their relative strengths and weaknesses (e.g.,
Marton & Tsui, 2004; Mercer, 2010).
In terms of substantive results, the research on dialogic
teaching supports and expands the theoretical propositions
outlined in Figure 1. Dialogic classrooms feature more egalitarian social organization, with authority over the content
and form of discourse shared among discussion participants
(e.g., R. J. Alexander, 2003; Beck, McKeown, Sandora, Kucan, & Worthy, 1996; Billings & Fitzgerald, 2002; Nystrand,
1997; Walsh, 2002). Students take on key responsibilities
for the flow of the discussion. They participate in managing
turns (self-selecting or nominating others), asking questions,
judging each other’s answers, introducing new topics, and
suggesting procedural changes.
Studies also reveal that dialogic inquiry is prompted by
and supported through the use of open-ended questions (Beck

et al., 1996; Billings & Fitzgerald, 2002; Mercer & Littleton,
2007; Nystrand, 1997; Soter et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 2003).
These questions serve to engage students in critical evaluation and analysis, offering them the experience of conducting
genuine, firsthand inquiry. Students take on personal positions on the issues and support them with reasons, examples,
and other evidence. They make lengthy, elaborate contributions, during which they explain their thinking to others (e.g.,
R. J. Alexander, 2005; Beck et al., 1996; Chinn et al., 2001;
Reznitskaya et al., 2012).
Interactions in dialogic classrooms are characterized by
metalevel talk, as class participants consistently reflect on
and monitor the processes and products of a discussion. (Almasi et al., 2001; Applebee et al., 2003; Junker et al., 2006;
Walsh, 2002; Wolf, Crosson, & Resnick, 2006). Teachers
play an important role in supporting metalevel talk by providing meaningful feedback that inspires further inquiry (Beck
et al., 1996; Henning & Lockhart, 2003; Nystrand et al.,
2003; e.g., Scott et al., 2006; Walsh, 2002; Wolf et al., 2006).
Teachers build upon student answers by asking for clarification, prompting for alternative perspectives, and encouraging
students to relate their ideas to those of their peers in the discussion. As a result, students in dialogic classrooms get to
participate in collaborative construction of knowledge (R. J.
Alexander, 2005; Beck et al., 1996; Chinn et al., 2001; Junker
et al., 2006; Mercer & Littleton, 2007). Students often “take
up” the preceding contribution to further develop the group’s
reasoning. Their responses are “chained into coherent lines of
inquiry” (R. J. Alexander, 2003, p. 37), as they listen to and
react to each others’ positions and justifications. Consider
the following example of group reasoning, taken from our
recent study of dialogic teaching (Reznitskaya et al., 2012).
In this excerpt, fifth graders debate the question of whether
students should be allowed to choose which school subjects
they study.
Tammy

Brian

Ann

I agree with Rob that you should pick your classes
in high school and college because when you
get to high school and college, you’re responsible enough to make your own decisions for what
you want to learn. So . . . Brian.
Yeah, in high school and college, you should have
a responsibility to pick what you want to do because if you don’t pick something that you’re going to need later, it’s your fault. . . . If you do every
class it’s going to take a long time to get through.
. . . Ann.
I disagree. Because in high school, let’s say the last
year when you’re almost ready to get a job, what if
you get a teacher—cause in high school they make
you take some classes—so, what if you’re going
for math, like me. But then you get an English
teacher who is really an inspiration, and she just
made you love English. Now you have to go all
the way back to high school, so that you can be a
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Teacher
Cindy

major in English? And what Cindy said about the
fashion designer, how she doesn’t have to learn
math. She does! Because what if they’re saying,
“You need three feet of this material to make a
hat.” And then she goes to the store and now she’s
buying two yards because she doesn’t know how
many feet are in a yard. She needs to know that.
You shook your head, so you’re kind of agreeing
with that?
Kind of, because I know I have to learn math
because of the fashion thing.

In this excerpt, students provided lengthy explanations of
their opinions, supporting them with reasons and examples.
Moreover, students connected to one another’s responses,
collaboratively building a more nuanced answer to the discussion question. For example, Brian elaborated the position
taken by Tammy, and Ann introduced a counterargument,
which made Cindy revise her position.
Based on the volume and consistency of the findings on
classroom discourse, we now have a theoretically grounded
and empirically supported understanding of the types of linguistic and participatory practices that appear on a “social
plane,” or in a class discussion. Students in dialogic classrooms get to observe and use the tools of language and thinking that are required for effective engagement in reasoned argumentation. Less is known, however, about how these tools
get appropriated and subsequently used by the students in
new contexts, which is the topic that we turn to next.

Learning Processes and Outcomes
One of the more direct tests of the theorized processes of
internalization during dialogic discussions was conducted
by Anderson and his colleagues (2001). This study examined whether students participating in inquiry dialogue pick
up and reuse effective argument stratagems that they see
other children using. Sifting through 48 discussion transcripts, the researchers tracked the occurrence of 13 distinct
stratagems. They concluded that the initial occurrence of a
given stratagem increased the likelihood of its later use. The
number of students who used novel language practices in
the initial versus later discussions also increased, supporting
the idea that students were able to acquire the “tools” of inquiry that were first introduced and modeled by their peers.
For example, one of the stratagems examined in the study
was a speech act intended to invite a classmate to speak, with
a general form “What do you think [NAME]?” The initial
probability of this stratagem being used in a discussion was
low (.25). However, after the stratagem was introduced to the
group, its likelihood of being used by other group members
jumped to .83 and remained high. Further, the use of argument stratagems by children was not a matter of thoughtless
mimicry. Instead, students seemed to have internalized im-
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portant metalevel knowledge about “what the stratagem is
good for, when to use it, and how to use it” (p. 4). For instance,
one student changed the original form of the stratagem to
“Would you like to share anything, [NAME]?” indicating
that she understood “the deep structure of an invitation to
participate rather than memorizing a string of words” (p. 15).
Anderson et al. (2001) noted that the concept of an argument stratagem combines “the notions of language form
and language function” (p. 3). This, in turn, provided the researchers with new approaches to “tracking” students’ development in social settings. We need more studies that generate evidence in relation to theorized psychological processes
responsible for changes in student behaviors. For example,
using an experimental design, a researcher can manipulate
specific language practices by strategically introducing different argument stratagems into discussions, in order to examine whether and how these stratagems become adapted
into individual argument schemas. Further, as discussion
participants may internalize both normative and fallacious
argument stratagems (e.g., appeals to tradition or emotion),
we need more studies that examine how a teacher can engage
students in evaluation and critique of argument stratagems
that may seem effective but are, in fact, flawed and misleading.
Although the study by Anderson et al. (2001) offered initial insights into the process of internalization, it did not
fully address the issue of transfer. That is, the researchers
observed students using argument stratagems during group
discussions. However, the question of whether these students
have acquired knowledge that they can carry outside of the
original learning context (i.e., group discussion) remains.
That is, will students be able to transfer their generalized
knowledge and skills to new tasks performed individually?
Studies that examined transfer performance in dialogic settings generally report positive results, including improved
reasoning (Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Mercer, Wegerif, & Dawes,
1999), increased inferential comprehension and argumentation about text (e.g., Murphy et al., 2009), enhanced quality
of post-intervention argumentative writing (Applebee et al.,
2003; Reznitskaya et al., 2001), as well as deeper conceptual understanding of disciplinary concepts and principles
(e.g., Asterhan & Schwarz, 2007; Chinn, O’Donnell, & Jinks,
2000). For example, in our earlier study of a dialogic approach to reading instruction called Collaborative Reasoning
(CR; Waggoner et al., 1995), we evaluated postintervention
reasoning skills of elementary school students (Reznitskaya
et al., 2001). In this study, students in three experimental
classrooms participated in dialogic discussions using CR for
a period of 5 weeks. These students did not receive any
instruction in written argumentation. At the end of the 5week period, students from experimental and matched control classrooms were given a written task requiring them
to reflect on a dilemma faced by a story character. Student
essays were compared in terms of the total number of elements composing an argument schema, such as supporting
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reasons, counterarguments, and rebuttals. Students who experienced CR had a significantly higher number of argument
components in their essays than their control counterparts.
A qualitative analysis of selected essays further revealed that
at least some CR students used specific argument stratagems
introduced during the intervention, including “Some people
might say [COUNTERARGUMENT].” We have suggested
that it is the use of these language tools that helped students
to consider and integrate alternative positions in their compositions, thus supporting an important shift from monologic
to dialogic thinking.
Although generally positive, the evidence regarding student outcomes in dialogic settings is rather weak for several
reasons. First, research investigating treatment effects in dialogic classrooms has many methodological limitations, such
as small sample sizes, design and data analysis flaws, and
less-than-ideal measurement tools. A recent extensive metaanalytic analysis of studies that investigated transfer effects
from discussion of text to reading comprehension and reasoning in new contexts revealed that when researchers applied
“best evidence criteria,” they were able to find only four
studies that showed positive transfer (Wilkinson & Murphy,
2011). The best evidence criteria included the requirements
that the study (a) used an experimental or quasi-experimental
design, (b) had at least “2 teachers and 15 students in each
treatment group,” (c) administered reading and/or writing
posttests that were “independent of the texts” that students
had previously discussed, and (d) reported pretest data about
initial group difference or used random assignment of at least
30 units.
Thus, to enhance the quality of evidence on transfer performance, we need more research that has high methodological standards. Consider, for example, the issues related to the
measurement of student outcomes following the engagement
in inquiry dialogue. Previous studies often used postintervention measures that were too contextually similar to the
learning situation (e.g., Dong, Anderson, Li, & Kim, 2008;
Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997; Reznitskaya et al., 2001; Shipman, 1983). This research may be overestimating the effectiveness of dialogic teaching, as the documented gains may
not generalize to other relevant contexts. As argued by Shepard (2000), “all too often . . . mastery appears pat and certain
but does not travel to new situations because students have
mastered classroom routines and not the underlying concepts” (p. 11). An important goal for future studies is to use
postintervention tasks that do not depend on the assessment
format being identical or even similar to the learning context,
thus allowing for a more thorough examination of the transfer potential of dialogic teaching. Identified elements of an
argument schema can help future researchers to design measurement tools that have important structural commonalities
with dialogic instruction but vary in surface characteristics.
In addition, treatment effects in a number of studies were
small and/or inconsistent across multiple groups, as well
as depending on outcome measures and/or statistical pro-

cedures used (e.g., Dong et al., 2008; Mercer & Littleton,
2007; Reznitskaya, Anderson, & Kuo, 2007; Wegerif et al.,
1999). Unstable results raise important issues about the robustness of internalized language and thought practices, as
well as possible interactions between dialogic teaching and
the characteristics of the group members, including their
ability, gender, personality traits, and relative status (see also
Cohen & Lotan, 1995; Schwarz et al., 2000; Webb et al.,
2007). Inconsistent treatment effects also invite questions
about the limits of group argumentation being a model for
the development of individual reasoning. Kuhn (1992), a
strong advocate of group debates, questioned “whether the
generation and deliberation of alternative viewpoints in dialogic argument are sufficient conditions for the development
of competent argumentative reasoning” (p. 176). One example of a promising addition to dialogic discussions is explicit
instruction in abstract rules and principles of argumentation,
presented in the context of oral debates. Several studies of
explicit teaching of argumentation have found it to be beneficial for students’ performance (Andrews, Torgerson, Low,
& McGuinn, 2009; Crowhurst, 1987; Yeh, 1998), but more
research is needed to help us better understand the ways in
which dialogic discussions can be integrated with explicit
teaching, or other instructional strategies, to promote the development of stronger skills and knowledge.
Finally, important theoretical propositions, such as the hypothesized mechanisms of internalization of individual psychological functions, remain largely unexamined, because
studies that systematically analyze causal connections between the dialogic properties of discussions and the performance on transfer tasks are lacking. Research that investigated the relationship between dialogue and learning relied
primarily on correlational techniques and often focused on
measuring the mastery of disciplinary knowledge, and not argumentation itself (e.g., Applebee et al., 2003; Chinn et al.,
2000; Veenman, Denessen, Akker, & Rijt, 2005). Nevertheless, these studies provide important insights into specific discourse features that potentially mediate student learning. For
example, free exchanges of information among discussion
participants, representing a “quintessential form of dialogic
interaction,” were positively associated with individual students’ performance on a writing task scored for the displayed
levels of abstraction and elaboration (Applebee et al., 2003).
In the Chinn et al. (2000) study, more complex collaborative argument structures produced by the group discussing
the functioning of electrical circuits were associated with individual transfer performance. Some researchers suggested
that different features of dialogic interaction could lead to internalization of different individual outcomes (Chinn et al.,
2000; Gage & Needels, 1989; Sugimoto, 1999). Although intriguing, this suggestion remains highly speculative. It needs
to be researched further using methodological approaches
that allow for the experimental manipulation of well-defined
processes of instruction in order to test their influence on the
individual performance on transfer tasks.
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Student Epistemologies
Considered next is research on epistemological beliefs of the
students. Studies examining the relationship between epistemology and student learning suggest that higher levels of
epistemological development are related to students’ active
engagement, as well their use of more productive learning
strategies (e.g., Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl, 2010; Schreiber &
Shinn, 2003; Simpsona & Nista, 1997). Personal epistemology also predicts individual performance on academic tasks.
Students with more advanced epistemologies are more likely
to better comprehend texts, to develop a deeper conceptual
understanding of a given subject, to identify informal reasoning fallacies, and to construct arguments of higher quality (e.g., Kuhn, 1991; Mason & Scirica, 2006; Nussbaum,
Sinatra, & Poliquin, 2008; Qian & Alvermann, 2000; Songer
& Linn, 1991; Stromso & Braten, 2009; Weinstock, 2006;
Weinstock, Neuman, & Tabak, 2004). For example, Mason
and Scirica (2006) measured epistemological levels of middle school students using a task developed by Kuhn, Cheney,
and Weinstock (2000). The task required participants to judge
the truth-value of pairs of statements by responding to questions, such as “Can only one of these views be right, or could
both have some rightness? Could one view be better or more
right than the other?” Participants in the study exhibited two
levels of epistemological development, multiplist and evaluativist. The researchers then assessed argumentation skills
by asking students to generate arguments, counterarguments,
and rebuttals about controversial topics (i.e., global warming and genetically modified food). Relating epistemological levels to performance on argumentation task, researchers
showed that evaluativists generated arguments, counterarguments, and rebuttals of higher quality. This study, together
with other research connecting student epistemologies to important academic outcomes, supports the theoretical claims
outlined in this article, indicating that epistemological beliefs
may act as general filters that direct one’s cognitive functioning (see also Schreiber & Shinn, 2003).
Considering the potential significance of personal epistemology for student learning, it is surprising how little we
know today about effective pedagogical practices that can
bring about changes in epistemological beliefs. The theoretical model presented in this article, as well as other similar frameworks (e.g., Gutierrez, Rymes, & Larson, 1995;
Paul, 1986; Wells, 1999; Windschitl, 2002), suggests that
classroom discourse can influence the development of students’ epistemologies. However, few studies have investigated this claim (e.g., Johnston, Woodside-Jiron, & Day,
2001; Kawasaki, Herrenkohl, & Yeary, 2004; Kuhn & Crowell, 2011; Valanides & Angeli, 2005). For example, in a
qualitative study, Johnston and colleagues (2001) compared
student epistemological development in two fourth-grade
Language Arts classrooms, one with primarily dialogic patterns of discourse and the other with largely monologic patterns. Researchers observed that students in the two class-
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rooms “held different views of what it means to be competent,
the significance of technical competence, the significance of
literate activity, the sense of agency in learning and knowledge production, and the significance they place on their
own and others’ experience” (p. 230). For instance, in a dialogic classroom students were “apprenticed” into developing
a sense that literary knowledge comes from negotiation of
viewpoints introduced by their peers, rather than from the
teacher or the book. In contrast, students in a monologic
classroom viewed literacy as the mastery of technical conventions of writing and the teacher as the only authority
that can evaluate students’ competence. The authors have
concluded that classroom discourse not only affects the contents of substantive knowledge learned by the students, but
also leads to internalization of different “routines of behavior
and patterns of values, beliefs, roles, identities, and ways of
knowing” (Johnston et al., 2001, p. 231).
In another qualitative study (Kawasaki et al., 2004), researchers examined epistemological development in an elementary science classroom by engaging students in carefully designed group activities. During these activities, students learned about sinking and floating by experimenting
with various objects and then interpreting their observations
through participating in a dialogic inquiry, orchestrated by the
teacher. As the study progressed, researchers were able to observe gradual changes in students’ epistemological stances.
For example, students acquired more tolerance for ambiguity, began to accept the tentative nature of scientific claims,
and added complexity to their understanding of the relationship between theory and evidence. Researchers concluded
that students were able to develop more mature epistemologies because they “experienced science not as a collection
of facts to be learned, but as a murky on-going endeavor for
better explanations” (Kawasaki et al., 2004, p. 1314).
Thus, existing studies, although scarce, cautiously suggest that student epistemologies can be developed through
instruction that centers around disciplined inquiry and deliberation of multiple viewpoints. We need to further analyze the mechanisms by which students acquire and change
their views about knowledge and knowing, using different
methodological approaches and measurement tools. In terms
of measurement, we suggest that researchers move away
from exclusively relying on self-reported measures, such as
commonly used Epistemological Questionnaire developed
by Schommer (1990) or similar tools (e.g., Schraw, 2001).
Although Schommer’s tool is simple and practical, it has
been criticized for failing to capture the full complexity of
the measured attribute and having limited validity evidence
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schraw, 2001). With Schommer’s
measure, respondents are asked to endorse short, decontextualized statements about knowledge and knowing, which lack
nuance and complexity (i.e., “the only thing that certain is
uncertainty itself ”). Because students are unlikely to have
had many opportunities to examine their own epistemologies, they may remain largely unaware of their true beliefs
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and are not capable of correctly reporting about them. Thus,
the level of epistemological development may be best measured indirectly, such as with the use of strategically designed
tasks and probing questions. Examples of such measures include the tools designed by P. M. King and Kitchener (1994);
Kuhn (1991); and Kuhn et al. (2000). Another problem with
measuring epistemology using questionnaires with universal
statements about knowledge and knowing is that epistemic
aims and knowledge structures may be highly context specific (Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011). Thus,
researchers need to use more refined and situated measures
in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of multiple dimensions of students’ epistemological development (Chinn
et al., 2011).
Teacher Epistemologies
Studies of teachers’ epistemologies show that the beliefs
about knowledge and knowing are generally congruent with
the pedagogical choices of practitioners (e.g., Richardson,
Anders, Tidwell, & Lloyd, 1991; Schraw & Olafson, 2002;
Sinatra & Kardash, 2004; Stipek, Givvin, Salmon, & MacGyvers, 2001). In the study by Johnston and colleagues
(2001) discussed earlier, researchers found that teachers’
epistemologies were directly aligned with their instruction,
influencing the power relations between teachers and students
and their interactional patterns, including the type of questions discussed and the feedback given to students. Specifically, during class discussions, the teacher with absolutist
beliefs engaged students in highly monologic exchanges,
characteristic of a typical recitation sequence.
At no point do the students get control of the topic of discourse, represent themselves as knowers, or in engage in
academic discussion in response to each other’s comments.
They offer information, but only to get the right answer and
have it verified by the teacher. (Johnston et al., 2001, p. 226)

In contrast, in a classroom of the evaluativist teacher, authority was distributed: Students voted on the processes of
the discussion, generated questions, and engaged with one
another’s ideas. In this classroom, “students expect to participate in shared knowledge production, and they value their
own and others’ experience in the process. The teacher actively undermines the singularity of her own authority or that
of the text, which is evident in students’ voices” (Johnston
et al., 2001, p. 230).
However, the relationship between teacher beliefs and
practice is not simple, and our understanding of it is far from
complete. Several researchers have found that subscribing
to more sophisticated ideas about knowledge and knowing
might not always relate to the use of inquiry dialogue in
a classroom (Alvermann et al., 1990; Schraw & Olafson,
2002). Alvermann et al. (1990) speculated that inconsistencies between endorsed epistemologies and classroom prac-

tices might happen when teachers are in the processes of
changing their beliefs, with “changes in beliefs preceding
changes in practice” (p. 579). Alternatively, Hofer (2002)
suggested that teachers might hold conflicting beliefs about
knowledge construction in different disciplines, and this, in
turn, might lead to inconsistencies in their classroom behaviors. We need more studies that help to explain how different
epistemological stances translate into teacher actions. What
are the reasons for the documented inconsistencies between
belief and practice? Why do even more enthusiastic practitioners, who embrace the underlying principles of dialogic
teaching, struggle with actually using dialogue in a classroom
(e.g., Billings & Fitzgerald, 2002; Richardson et al., 1991;
Windschitl, 2002)? How do teachers’ epistemological beliefs
interact with those of their students (Hofer, 2001; Sinatra &
Kardash, 2004)? One searches in vain for data-based answers
to these questions.
If different levels of teachers’ epistemological development lead to different pedagogical choices, then the subject of epistemology needs to be directly addressed through
teacher education and professional development programs.
Several scholars have argued for the need to help aspiring
and practicing teachers to advance their theories of knowledge through the use of explicit instruction, personal reflection, and coaching (Richardson et al., 1991; Schraw & Olafson, 2002; Sinatra & Kardash, 2004; Windschitl, 2002). Yet
only a few studies have evaluated the effectiveness of specific educational interventions, such as the use of autobiography (Bushnell & Henry, 2003) and incorporation of group
discussions and journal writing about personal epistemologies in educational psychology courses (Brownlee, Purdie,
& Boulton-Lewis, 2001; Hill, 2000). We need to develop and
test instructional models that help teachers reflect on their
epistemological commitments in relation to the advocated
classroom practices.
The need for alternative models for teacher preparation
is further underscored by the emerging evidence that college education, including teacher preparation programs, is
not successful at advancing student epistemologies (Brownlee et al., 2001; Schraw & Olafson, 2002). One study even
suggested that typical college courses in education might actually inhibit the development of more sophisticated epistemologies (C. A. King, Levesque, Weckerly, & Blythe, 2000).
As argued by the authors,
Although we do try to teach our students that knowledge
evolves and can be best understood in context, the field of
education as a whole is oriented towards teaching a body of
knowledge which is valued in our culture and which we, as
teachers, tend to accept as fact. (p. 7)

Similarly, Hofer (2001) concluded her review of research on
personal epistemologies by suggesting that “our “educated
citizenry” may in fact be largely composed of individuals
who view the world from a position of absolutism, or who
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simply accept a multiplicity of opinions about complex issues, seeing no need to support positions with evidence” (p.
369). It is possible that the ineffectiveness of teacher education programs in advancing epistemological understanding
can account for the continued prevalence of monologic instruction in contemporary schools.
To summarize, empirical research on dialogic teaching
and learning, although generally supportive of the proposed
theory, is limited and occasionally inconsistent. This is troublesome, especially considering that much of the existing
literature on the use of inquiry dialogue is focused either on
its pedagogical promise (Freire, 1993; Lipman, 1988; Paul,
1986) or on essentially anecdotal accounts of its success (e.g.,
Barell, 2003; Fisher, 2001; Lindfors & Townsend, 1999). As
a result, teachers may underestimate the complexity of dialogic teaching, while overestimating its effectiveness. To
move from idealized descriptions of inquiry dialogue to its
skillful application in their classrooms, teachers need to rely
on a thorough, research-based understanding of dialogic instruction and its effects on student development.

Victoria
Teacher
Jon
Teacher
Edna
Teacher
Jim

Teacher
Kelly

Teacher
Tim

TRANSFORMING CLASSROOM DISCOURSE
The use of the traditional recitation sequence has been
broadly discussed, analyzed, and criticized in previous studies (R. J. Alexander, 2008; Alvermann et al., 1990; Cazden,
2001; Henning & Lockhart, 2003; Nystrand et al., 2003).
This is why we chose another pattern of classroom communication to illustrate some of the challenges faced by today’s
practitioners. The following transcript comes from our recent
study of classroom discourse in elementary school Language
Arts classrooms (Reznitskaya et al., 2012). A novice teacher
in this excerpt tries to facilitate a dialogic discussion of a
story about the plight of African slaves.
Teacher

Ellen

Teacher
Tim
Teacher
Doug
Teacher
Cane

Teacher

Who are slaves? When you think of slaves, what
kind of people are really slaves, in your mind?
Ah, Ellen?
Like, they are, like um, in my mind, kind of, like,
someone who really doesn’t have the benefits of
making their own choices, figuring out what they
want to do, what their destiny should be. It’s kind
of somebody who really doesn’t have any kind of
freedom.
Excellent. What do you think, Tim?
Um, people who work for others.
OK. Doug?
People who are forced against their will.
People who are forced against their will. Excellent, guys. Cane?
People who are forced against their will to work
for somebody even somebody that they really
don’t want to.
Victoria?

Teacher
Todd

Teacher
Cane

Teacher
Sal

Teacher
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People who are forced to do stuff by people who
control them and, yeah . . .
OK. Jon?
People who don’t really get to think for themselves, and the others are just kind of controlling.
OK. Edna? Good.
People who don’t have any freedom.
People who don’t have any freedom. Good. Janet?
[5 minutes later]
Well there isn’t any reason why they [slaveholders] should be able to have slaves because everyone is equal, so it doesn’t really make sense that
someone just like . . . Like, they are all different, and one has to do everything what the other
person says. It’s just not fair.
All right . . . Kelly?
Might be that the slave masters, probably, might
have thought that they were not as good as them.
Maybe, the slaves were better than them.
OK, that’s an interesting point. Let’s see . . . Tim?
The owners kind of owned them, I think like,
maybe, they thought that they were so much powerful, they could do everything and that probably
anyone else couldn’t do anything.
OK. Good. Todd?
Well I don’t think that anybody has the right to
mistreat anybody else, because like we were all
created equal and we are all the same person, and
it does not matter what color our skin is or what
color our hair is. It’s just like we are all the same.
OK, good. Cane?
Like there should be no reason that somebody
must mistreat anybody. They must treat somebody how they want to be treated, and, say, like
the person who was the slave was the slave master, how would they like it if they were made to
work like slaves?
Good. Sal?
Well, nothing gives the right to people who mistreat others, because like the slaves difference
shouldn’t be. . . . Like create a big problem and
stuff like that.
OK. Eleanor?

The preceding excerpt started with a teacher asking students a truly open-ended question (i.e., “Who are slaves?”).
She did not seem to have a specific answer in mind, and
proceeded to solicit multiple ideas from a large number of
students. Unfortunately, as the discussion developed, it became clear that although this teacher abandoned the traditional recitation script, with its heavy use of factual, test-type
questions, she has not yet developed an appropriate alternative. Perhaps, this teacher’s intent to be “constructivist”
immobilized her, leaving her with very limited functions as
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a discussion facilitator: providing superficial feedback (e.g.,
Excellent, OK, Good) and nominating the next speaker. The
discussion remained superficial because students had limited
opportunities to work with one another’s ideas. They simply
stated what they think in a sequential fashion, essentially disregarding the input of others. Student ideas were treated as
merely opinions, rather than as hypotheses to be taken up,
tested, and reconstructed. The lack of consideration for what
had been said by others produced many repetitive statements,
as demonstrated, for example, by the remarks of the three students at the end of the excerpt, as they rehashed the idea of
people having no right to mistreat others.
It could be argued that as teachers discard the most basic,
absolutist views of knowledge and learning, they progress
next to the intermediate, multiplist, stage of epistemological
development. Because multiplists consider all viewpoints to
be equally acceptable, there is no need to coordinate or evaluate them through the use of reasoning and reflection (Kuhn,
1991). In the excerpt just presented, students had more opportunities to talk, compared to a traditional classroom. However, their contributions received no further scrutiny by the
group, and the time was spent on the sharing of opinions,
which remained unexamined and disjointed. R. J. Alexander
(2008) termed this sad new reality a “pseudo-enquiry.” Possibly prompted by increasingly influential, but not fully understood educational theories that focus on “knowledge discovery by learners,” many teachers move away from recitation.
Unfortunately, they then end up engaging students in “an endless sequence of ostensibly open questions which stem from
a desire to avoid didacticism, are unfocused and unchallenging, and are coupled with a habitual and eventually phatic
praise rather than meaningful feedback” (R. J. Alexander,
2005, p. 3). In a similar way, Elmore, Peterson, and McCarthey (1996) observed a teacher in science classrooms
set up an “exciting, hands-on activity” that offered students
multiple opportunities for inquiry learning. Regrettably, the
teacher then failed to engage students in disciplined deliberation of various viewpoints, thus leaving them “with different
discoveries and understandings of their findings” (p. 41).
The problems experienced by teachers who try to use innovative instructional approaches, advocated by theorists and
researchers, raise serious questions about the effectiveness of
professional preparation programs. The key goal of teacher
education is to help practitioners develop coherent pedagogical frameworks that integrate both theoretical and practical
knowledge. Real transformation of classroom communication will happen only when teachers
think differently about what is going on in their classrooms,
and are provided with the practices that match the different
ways of thinking. The provision of practices without theory may lead to misimplementation or no implementation
at all. . . . Changing beliefs without proposing practices that
embody those theories may lead to frustration. (Richardson
et al., 1991, p. 579)

More research is needed to determine how professional
preparation programs can help teachers to acquire a wellbalanced mix of relevant beliefs, knowledge, and skills.
It is also important for preservice and in-service teachers to learn how abstract theoretical principles about knowledge, teaching, and learning can be transformed into specific
classroom practices. There are several well-established pedagogical models centered around inquiry dialogue that have
theoretical and empirical foundations, as well as curriculum
materials to support classroom applications. Examples include Philosophy for Children/Community of Inquiry (Gregory, 2006; Lipman, 1988), Collaborative Reasoning (Waggoner et al., 1995), Accountable Talk (Wolf et al., 2006),
and Thinking Together (Dawes, Mercer, & Wegerif, 2003).
Unfortunately, these and similar comprehensive pedagogies
have not been widely shared with teachers. Instead, many
teachers adopt isolated novel activities or strategies, such
as small-group discussions, without fully appreciating the
underlying meaning of these practices (Fullan, 1991; Windschitl, 2002). This leads to the distortion of the original intent.
Providing comprehensive, rather than fragmented, curriculum support may lead to more meaningful changes in teachers’ language use in a classroom.
In a discussion of key principles of successful professional
development programs, Elmore (2002) convincingly argued
that “few people willfully engage in practices that they know
to be ineffective; most educators have good reasons to think
that they are doing the best work they can” (p. 19). Thus,
practitioners need opportunities to reexamine their own
teaching through systematic and critical study of their classroom communication (Walsh, 2002). However, merely engaging teachers in viewing videotapes of their lessons may
not bring about the desired changes in beliefs and practices.
In a revealing study by Alvermann et al. (1990), teachers
did not seem to notice any contradictions between their expressed commitment to hold “open-forum discussions” and
the actual use of recitation in their classroom, even when they
were invited to watch the videotapes of their interactions.
Thus, teacher training should support practitioners in becoming more cognizant of their language use and critical
about their pedagogical choices. Wilkinson and colleagues
(2010) recently discussed an example of a professional development program designed to help practicing teachers learn
to enact dialogic discussions about text and “to make judgments about the quality of talk” (p. 6). During the program,
teachers met individually with their “discourse coaches” to
view the videos of their classroom interactions, using an
observational measure of talk. Discourse coaches encouraged “dialogue about videotaped discussions” by focusing
teacher’s attention on the important features of discourse
through the use of the observational tool (Wilkinson et al.,
2010, p. 9). “For example, if the teachers made an observation about an aspect of discourse . . . the coach might extend
the teacher’s observation with an example from the video
or a teaching point that might further understanding of the
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discourse” (p. 9). The authors have discussed the importance
of comprehensive professional development programs, during which teachers are not only provided with the needed
instructional materials (i.e., an observational measure of
talk) but also coached to use these materials so that they
can engage in a meaningful reflection about language and
learning.
To conclude, the pedagogical promise of dialogic teaching continues to appeal to many educators concerned with
empowering their students to become independent thinkers
and active citizens. However, our understanding of this inherently complex educational practice is incomplete and
imprecise. Further, efforts to transform the traditional language of schooling have not produced the desirable changes;
and recitation and, more recently, pseudo-inquiry continue to
dominate teacher–student communication (R. J. Alexander,
2008; Nystrand et al., 2003). Through integration of multiple
fields in educational research, this article presented a comprehensive theoretical account of dialogic teaching and articulated testable predictions regarding the changes in students’
personal epistemologies, argument schemas, and substantive
knowledge, as a result of their engagement in reasoned discourse with peers.
We have also argued for the need for more empirical studies that examine causal connections between language and
learning; connect multiple strands of research, such as epistemology and classroom discourse; analyze dialogic interaction in combination with other instructional approaches;
rely on valid measurement tools; and investigate the necessary changes in teacher education. Current difficulties with
promoting dialogic teaching in schools should not lead us to
abandon this method because potentially and occasionally it
creates classroom experiences that are authentic, inclusive,
and rational. To collaborate with others in a process of shared
inquiry, to possess a general argument schema and use it in
relevant situations, to hold sophisticated beliefs about the negotiated nature of knowledge, and to be willing to reconsider
and reconstruct previously held commitments when encountering good reasons to do so: These capacities are central
not only to academic achievement but also to living a meaningful life and to playing an active role in resolving various
controversies that continually arise in a civil society. We can
only benefit from helping our teachers and students embrace
inquiry dialogue in their classrooms.
REFERENCES
Alexander, P. A., Fives, H., Buehl, M. M., & Mulhern, J. (2002). Teaching as persuasion. Teaching and Teacher Education, 18, 795–813.
doi:10.1016/S0742-051X(02)00044-6
Alexander, R. J. (2003). Talk for learning: The first year. Northallerton, UK:
North Yorkshire County Council.
Alexander, R. J. (2005, July). Culture, dialogue and learning: Notes on an
emerging pedagogy. Paper presented at the Conference of the International Association for Cognitive Education and Psychology, University of
Durham, UK.

129

Alexander, R. J. (2008). Essays on pedagogy. New York, NY: Routledge.
Almasi, J. F., O’Flahavan, J. F., & Arya, P. (2001). A comparative analysis of student and teacher development in more or less proficient
discussions of literature. Reading Research Quarterly, 36, 96–120.
doi:10.1598/RRQ.36.2.1
Alrø, H., & Skovsmose, O. (2000). Dialogue and learning in mathematics education: Intention, reflection, critique. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic.
Alvermann, D. E., O’Brien, D. G., & Dillon, D. R. (1990). What teachers
do when they say they’re having discussions of content area reading
assignments: A qualitative analysis. Reading Research Quarterly, 25,
297–322. doi:10.2307/747693
Anderson, R. C. (1977). The notion of schemata and the educational enterprise. In R. C. Anderson, R. J. Spiro, & W. E. Montague (Eds.),
Schooling and the acquisition of knowledge (pp. 415–431). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Anderson, R. C., Nguyen-Jahiel, K., McNurlen, B., Archodidou, A., Kim,
S., Reznitskaya, A., . . . Gilbert, L. (2001). The snowball phenomenon:
Spread of ways of talking and ways of thinking across groups of children.
Cognition and Instruction, 19, 1–46. doi:10.1207/S1532690XCI1901 1
Anderson, R. C., & Pichert, J. W. (1978). Recall of previously unrecallable information following a shift in perspective. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17, 1–12. Retrieved from
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5371(78)90485-1
Andrews, R., Torgerson, C., Low, G., & McGuinn, N. (2009). Teaching
argument writing to 7- to 14-year-olds: An international review of the
evidence of successful practice. Cambridge Journal of Education, 39,
291–310. doi:10.1080/03057640903103751
Applebee, A. N., Langer, J. A., Nystrand, M., & Gamoran, A.
(2003). Discussion-based approaches to developing understanding:
Classroom instruction and student performance in middle and high
school English. American Educational Research Journal, 40, 685–730.
doi:10.3102/00028312040003685
Asterhan, C. S. C., & Schwarz, B. B. (2007). The effects of monological
and dialogical argumentation on concept learning in evolutionary theory. Journal of Educational Psychology, 99, 626–639. doi:10.1037/00220663.99.3.626
Bakhtin, M. M. (1984). Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics (Vol. 8). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Bakhtin, M. M. (1986). Speech genres and other late essays (V. W. McGee,
Trans.). Austin: University of Texas Press.
Barell, J. (2003). Developing more curious minds. Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
Beck, I. L., McKeown, M. G., Sandora, C., Kucan, L., & Worthy, J. (1996).
Questioning the author: A year-long classroom implementation to engage
students with text. The Elementary School Journal, 96, 385–414.
Bereiter, C., & Scardamalia, M. (1982). From conversation to composition:
The role of instruction in a developmental process. In R. Glaser (Ed.),
Advances in instructional psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 1–64). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Billings, L., & Fitzgerald, J. (2002). Dialogic discussion and the
Paideia seminar. American Educational Research Journal, 39, 907–941.
doi:10.3102/00028312039004905
Bransford, J. D., & Johnson, M. K. (1972). Contextual prerequisites for understanding: Some investigations of comprehension and recall. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 717–726. doi:10.1016/S00225371(72)80006-9
Bromme, R., Pieschl, S., & Stahl, E. (2010). Epistemological beliefs are
standards for adaptive learning: a functional theory about epistemological beliefs and metacognition. Metacognition and Learning, 5, 7.
doi:10.1007/s11409-009-9053-5
Brownlee, J., Purdie, N., & Boulton-Lewis, G. (2001). Changing epistemological beliefs in pre-service teacher education students. Teaching in
Higher Education, 6, 247–268. doi:10.1080/13562510120045221
Burbules, N. (1993). Dialogue in teaching: Theory and practice. New York,
NY: Teachers College Press.

130

REZNITSKAYA AND GREGORY

Bushnell, M., & Henry, S. E. (2003). The role of reflection in epistemological
change: Autobiography in tecacher education. Educational Studies, 34,
38–61.
Carey, S. (1985). Are children fundamentally different thinkers and learners than adults? In S. Chipman, J. Segal & R. Glaser (Eds.), Thinking
and learning skills: Current research and open questions (Vol. 2, pp.
485–517). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cazden, C. B. (2001). Classroom discourse: The language of teaching and
learning. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Chambliss, M. J. (1995). Text cues and strategies successful readers use
to construct the gist of lengthy written arguments. Reading Research
Quarterly, 30, 778–807. doi:10.2307/748198
Cheng, P., & Holyoak, K. J. (1985). Pragmatic reasoning schemas. Cognitive
Psychology, 17, 391–416. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90014-3
Chinn, C. A., & Anderson, R. C. (1998). The structure of discussions that
promote reasoning. Teachers College Record, 100, 315–368.
Chinn, C. A., Anderson, R. C., & Waggoner, M. A. (2001). Patterns of discourse in two kinds of literature discussion. Reading Research Quarterly,
36, 378–411. doi:10.1598/RRQ.36.4.3
Chinn, C. A., Buckland, L. A., & Samarapungavan, A. L. A. (2011).
Expanding the dimensions of epistemic cognition: Arguments from
philosophy and psychology. Educational Psychologist, 46, 141–167.
doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.587722
Chinn, C. A., O’Donnell, A. M., & Jinks, T. S. (2000). The structure of
discourse in collaborative learning. Journal of Experimental Education,
69, 77–97. doi:10.1080/00220970009600650
Cohen, E. G., & Lotan, R. A. (1995). Producing equal-status interaction in
the heterogeneous classroom. American Educational Research Journal,
32, 99–120. doi:10.2307/1163215
Cole, M., & Wertsch, J. V. (1996). Beyond the individual-social antimony in discussions of Piaget and Vygotsky. Human Development, 39,
250–256.
Crowhurst, M. (1987, April). The effects of reading instruction and writing instruction on reading and writing persuasion. Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association,
Washington, DC. Retrieved from ERIC database. (ED281148)
Dawes, L., Mercer, N., & Wegerif, R. (2003). Thinking Together: A programme of activities for developing speaking, listening and thinking skills
for children aged 8–11. Birmingham, UK: Imaginative Minds.
Dewey, J. (1933). How we think: A restatement of the relation of reflective
thinking to the educative process. Lexington, MA: Heath.
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The theory of inquiry. Troy, MA: Holt, Rinehard,
& Winston.
Dewey, J. (1967). Experience and education. New York, NY: Collier Books.
Dewey, J. (1988). The quest for certainty (Vol. 4). Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press.
Dong, T., Anderson, R. C., Li, Y., & Kim, I. (2008). Collaborative Reasoning in China and Korea. Reading Research Quarterly, 43, 400–424.
doi:10.1598/RRQ.43.4.5
Duschl, R. A., & Osborne, J. (2002). Supporting and promoting argumentation discourse in science education. Studies in Science Education, 38,
39–72. doi:10.1080/03057260208560187
Eagleton, T. (2003). Truth, virtue and objectivity. In After theory (pp.
103–139). New York, NY: Basic Books.
Elmore, R. F. (2002). Bridging the gap between standards and achievement:
The imperative for professional development in education. Washington,
DC: Albert Shanker Institute.
Elmore, R. F., Peterson, P. L., & McCarthey, S. J. (1996). Restructuring in the
classroom: Teaching, learning, and school organization. San Francisco,
CA: Jossey-Bass.
Fisher, R. (2001). Philosophy in primary schools: fostering thinking and
literacy. Reading, 35, 67–73. doi:10.1111/1467-9345.00164
Flavell, J. H. (1985). Cognitive development (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Freire, P. (1993). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York, NY: Continuum.

Fullan, M. (1991). The new meaning of educational change. New York, NY:
Teachers College Press.
Gage, N. L., & Needels, M. C. (1989). Product-process research on teaching:
A review of criticisms. The Elementary School Journal, 89, 253–300.
doi:10.1086/461577
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1987). The cognitive basis of knowledge
transfer. In S. M. Cormier (Ed.), Transfer of learning (pp. 9–47). San
Diego, CA: Academic.
Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Providence, RI: Foris.
Gregory, M. (2002). Constructivism, standards, and the classroom Community of Inquiry. Educational Theory, 52, 397–408. doi:10.1111/j.17415446.2002.00397.x
Gregory, M. (2004). Conflict, inquiry and education for peace. In S. N.
Chattopadhyay (Ed.), World peace: Problems of global understanding
and prospects of harmony. Calcutta, India: Naya Prokash.
Gregory, M. (2006). Normative dialogue types in philosophy for children. Gifted Education International, 2/3, 160–171. doi:10.1177/
026142940702200307
Gregory, M. (2007). A framework for facilitating classroom dialogue. Teaching Philosophy, 30, 59–84.
Gutierrez, K., Rymes, B., & Larson, B. (1995). Script, counterscript, and
underlife in the classroom: James Brown versus Brown v. Board of Education. Harvard Educational Review, 65, 445–472.
Halliday, M. A. K. (1993). Towards a language-based theory of
learning. Linguistics and Education, 5, 93–116. doi:10.1016/08985898(93)90026-7
Harpaz, Y. (2007). Approaches to teaching thinking: Toward a conceptual mapping of the field. Teachers College Record, 109, 1845–
1874.
Henning, J., & Lockhart, A. (2003). Acquiring art of classroom discourse:
A comparison of teacher and preservice teacher talk in a fifth grade
classroom. Research for Educational Reform, 8, 46–57.
Hill, L. (2000). What does it take to change minds? Intellectual development of preservice teachers. Journal of Teacher Education, 51, 50–62.
doi:10.1177/002248710005100106
Hofer, B. K. (2001). Personal epistemology research: Implications for
learning and teaching. Educational Psychology Review, 13, 353–383.
doi:10.1023/A:1011965830686
Hofer, B. K. (2002). Epistemological world views of teachers: From beliefs
to practice. Issues in education, 8, 167.
Hofer, B. K., & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and their relation
to learning. Review of Educational Research, 67, 88–140. doi:10.2307/
1170620
Johnston, P., Woodside-Jiron, H., & Day, J. (2001). Teaching and learning
literate epistemologies. Journal of Educational Psychology, 93, 223–233.
doi:10.1037/0022-0663.93.1.223
Junker, B. W., Matsumura, L. C., Crosson, A., Wolf, M. K., Levison, A.,
Wiesberg, J., & Resnick, L. (2006). Overview of the Instructional Quality
Assessment. Los Angeles: University of California, National Center for
Research on Evaluation, Standards, and Student Testing.
Kawasaki, K., Herrenkohl, L. R., & Yeary, S. A. (2004). Theory building and modeling in a sinking and floating unit: A case study of
third and fourth grade students’ developing epistemologies of science. International Journal of Science Education, 26, 1299–1324.
doi:10.1080/0950069042000177226
Keefer, M. W., Zeitz, C. M., & Resnick, L. B. (2000). Judging the quality of peer-led student dialogues. Cognition and Instruction, 18, 53–81.
doi:10.1207/S1532690XCI1801 03
Kennedy, D. (2004). The philosopher as a teacher: The role of a facilitator
in a community of philosophical inquiry. Metaphilosophy, 35, 744–765.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2004.00348.x
King, C. A., Levesque, M. J., Weckerly, S. J., & Blythe, N. L. (2000, April).
The effects of a course in educational psychology on pre-service teachers’

STUDENT THOUGHT AND CLASSROOM LANGUAGE

epistemological beliefs. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Educational Research Association, New Orleans.
King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (1994). Developing reflective judgment:
Understanding and promoting intellectual growth and critical thinking in
adolescents and adults. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kuhn, D. (1992). Thinking as argument. Harvard Educational Review, 62,
155–177. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203435854 chapter 7
Kuhn, D. (1999). A developmental model of critical thinking. Educational
Researcher, 28, 16–46. doi:10.3102/0013189×028002016
Kuhn, D. (2010). Teaching and learning science as argument. Science Education, 94, 810–824. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sce.20395
Kuhn, D., Cheney, R., & Weinstock, M. (2000). The development of
epistemological understanding. Cognitive Development, 15, 309–328.
doi:10.1016/s0885–2014(00)00030–7
Kuhn, D., & Crowell, A. (2011). Dialogic argumentation as a vehicle
for developing young adolescents’ thinking. Psychological Science, 22,
545–552. doi:10.1177/0956797611402512
Kuhn, D., & Dean, D. (2004). Metacognition: A bridge between cognitive
psychology and educational practice. Theory Into Practice, 43, 268–273.
doi:10.1207/s15430421tip4304 4
Kuhn, D., Shaw, V., & Felton, M. (1997). Effects of dyadic interaction on argumentative reasoning. Cognition and instruction, 15,
287–315.doi:10.1207/s1532690xci1503 1
Kuhn, D., & Udell, W. (2003). The development of argument skills. Child
Development, 74, 1245–1260. doi:10.1111/1467–8624.00605
Lefstein, A. (2010). More helpful as problem than solution: Some implications of situated dialogue in classrooms. In C. Littleton & C. Howe
(Eds.), Educational dialogues: understanding and promoting productive
interaction (pp. 170–191). London, UK: Routledge.
Lindfors, J. W., & Townsend, J. S. (Eds.). (1999). Teaching language arts:
Learning through dialogue. Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of
English.
Lipman, M. (1988). Philosophy goes to school. Philadelphia, PA: Temple
University Press.
Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity
in scientific inquiry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Luria, A. R. (1981). Language and cognition. New York, NY: Wiley.
Marton, F., & Tsui, A. B. M. (Eds.). (2004). Classroom discourse and the
space of learning. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mason, L., & Scirica, F. (2006). Prediction of students’ argumentation skills
about controversial topics by epistemological understanding. Learning
and Instruction, 16, 492–509. doi:10.1016/j.learninstruc.2006.09.007
Mead, G. H. (1962). Mind, self, and society from the standpoint of a social
behaviorist. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Mehan, H. (1998). The study of social interaction in educational settings: Accomplishments and unresolved issues. Human Development,
41, 245–269. doi:10.1159/000022586
Mercer, N. (2010). The analysis of classroom talk: Methods and
methodologies. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 80, 1–14.
doi:10.1348/000709909×479853
Mercer, N., & Littleton, K. (2007). Dialogue and the development
of children’s thinking: A socio-cultural approach. London, UK:
Routledge.
Mercer, N., Wegerif, R., & Dawes, L. (1999). Children’s talk and the development of reasoning in the classroom. British Educational Research
Journal, 25, 95–111. doi:10.1080/0141192990250107
Mishra, P., & Brewer, W. F. (2003). Theories as a form of mental representation and their role in the recall of text information. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 28, 277–303. doi:10.1016/S0361-476X(02)00040-1
Murphy, P. K., Soter, A., Wilkinson, I. A. G., Hennessey, M. N., & Alexander, J. F. (2009). Examining the effects of classroom discussion on students’ comprehension of text: A meta-analysis. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 101, 740–764. doi:10.1037/a0015576

131

Nussbaum, E. M. (2011). Argumentation, dialogue theory, and
probability modeling: Alternative frameworks for argumentation
research in education. Educational Psychologist, 46, 84–106.
doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.558816
Nussbaum, E. M., Sinatra, G. M., & Poliquin, A. (2008). Role of epistemic beliefs and scientific argumentation in science learning. International Journal of Science Education, 30, 1977–1999. doi:10.1080/
09500690701545919
Nystrand, M. (1997). Opening dialogue: Understanding dynamics of language and learning in the English classroom. New York, NY: Teacher
College Press.
Nystrand, M., Wu, L., Gamoran, A., Zeiser, S., & Long, D. A.
(2003). Questions in time: Investigating the structure and dynamics
of unfolding classroom discourse. Discourse Processes, 35, 135–200.
doi:10.1207/S15326950DP3502 3
Onosko, J. J. (1990). Comparing teacher instruction to promote
students’ thinking. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 22, 443–461.
doi:10.1080/0022027900220503
Paul, R. W. (1986). Dialogical thinking: Critical thought essential to the
acquisition of rational knowledge and passions. In J. B. Baron & R.
J. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching thinking skills: Theory and practice (pp.
127–148). New York: Freeman.
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The psychology of the child. New York,
NY: Basic Books.
Qian, Z., & Alvermann, D. E. (2000). Relationship between epistemological
beliefs and conceptual change learning. Reading & Writing Quarterly,
16, 59–74. doi:10.1080/105735600278060
Reed, S. K. (1993). A schema-based theory of transfer. In D. K. Detterman
& R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Transfer on trial: Intelligence, cognition, and
instruction (pp. 39–67). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Reznitskaya, A., Anderson, R. C., Dong, T., Li, Y., Kim, I., & Kim, S. (2008).
Learning to think well: Application of Argument Schema Theory. In C.
C. Block & S. Parris (Eds.), Comprehension instruction: Research-based
best practices (pp. 196–213). New York, NY: Guilford.
Reznitskaya, A., Anderson, R. C., & Kuo, L. (2007). Teaching and
learning argumentation. Elementary School Journal, 107, 449–472.
doi:10.1086/518623
Reznitskaya, A., Anderson, R. C., McNurlen, B., Nguyen-Jahiel,
K., Archodidou, A., & Kim, S. (2001). Influence of oral discussion on written argument. Discourse Processes, 32, 155–175.
doi:10.1207/S15326950DP3202&3 04
Reznitskaya, A., Glina, M., Carolan, B., Michaud, O., Rogers, J., & Sequeira,
L. (2012). Examining transfer effects from dialogic discussions to new
tasks and contexts. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 37, 288–306.
doi:10.1016/j.cedpsych.2012.02.003
Reznitskaya, A., Kuo, L., Clark, A., Miller, B., Jadallah, M., Anderson,
R. C., & Nguyen-Jahiel, K. (2009). Collaborative reasoning: A dialogic
approach to group discussions. Cambridge Journal of Education, 39,
29–48. doi:10.1080/03057640802701952
Richardson, V., Anders, P., Tidwell, D., & Lloyd, C. (1991). The Relationship between teachers’ beliefs and practices in reading comprehension Instruction. American Educational Research Journal, 28, 559–586.
doi:10.2307/1163149
Ross, W. D. (Ed.). (1952). Aristotle’s prior and posterior analytics. Oxford,
UK: Clarendon Press.
Rumelhart, D. E., & Ortony, A. (1977). The representation of knowledge
in memory. In R. C. Anderson, R. J. Spiro, & W. E. Montague (Eds.),
Schooling and the acquisition of knowledge (pp. 99–136). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding: An inquiry into human knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Schommer, M. (1990). Effects of beliefs about the nature of knowledge
on comprehension. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 498–504.
doi:10.1037//0022-0663.82.3.498

132

REZNITSKAYA AND GREGORY

Schraw, G. (2001). Current themes and future directions in epistemological research: A commentary. Educational Psychology Review, 451–464.
doi:10.1023/A:1011922015665
Schraw, G., & Olafson, L. (2002). Teachers’ episitemological world
views and educational practice. Issues in Education, 8, 99–149.
doi:10.1891/194589503787383109
Schreiber, J. B., & Shinn, D. (2003). Epistemological beliefs of community
college students and their learning processes. Community College Journal
of Research & Practice, 27, 699–710. doi:10.1080/713838244
Schwarz, B. B., Neuman, Y., & Biezuner, S. (2000). Two wrongs may make
a right . . . if they argue together! Cognition & Instruction, 18, 461–494.
doi:10.1207/S1532690XCI1804 2
Scott, P. S., Mortimer, E. F., & Aguiar, O. G. (2006). The tension between authoritative and dialogic discourse: A fundamental characteristic
of meaning making interactions in high school science lessons. Science
Education, 90, 605–631. doi:10.1002/sce.20131
Sharp, A. M., & Splitter, L. J. (1995). Teaching for better thinking. Melbourne, Australia: Australian Council for Philosophical Research.
Shepard, L. (2000). The role of assessment in a learning culture. Educational
Researcher, 29(7), 1–14. doi:10.2307/1176145
Shipman, V. C. (1983). Evaluation of the philosophy for children program
in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for
Children, 1, 37–40.
Sidorkin, A. M. (1999). The fine art of sitting on two stools: Multicultural
education between postmodernism and critical theory. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 18, 143–155. doi:10.1023/A:1005172810498
Simpsona, M., & Nista, S. L. (1997). Perspectives on learning history: A case study. Journal of Literacy Research, 29, 363–395.
doi:10.1080/10862969709547965
Sinatra, G. M., & Kardash, C. M. (2004). Teacher candidates’
epistemological beliefs, dispositions, and views on teaching as
persuasion. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 29, 483–498.
doi:10.1016/j.cedpsych.2004.03.001
Sohmer, R., Michaels, S., O’Connor, M. C., & Resnick, L. (2009). Guided
construction of knowledge in the classroom: teacher, talk, task, and tools.
In B. Schwarz, T. Dreyfus, & R. Hershkowitz (Eds.), Transformation of
knowledge through classroom interaction (pp. 105–129). London, UK:
Routledge.
Songer, N. B., & Linn, M. C. (1991). How do students’ view of science influence knowledge integration? Journal of Research in Science Teaching,
28, 761–784. doi:10.1002/tea.3660280905
Soter, A., Wilkinson, I. A. G., Murphy, P. K., Rudge, L., Reninger, K.,
& Edwards, M. (2008). What the discourse tells us: Talk and indicators of high-level comprehension. International Journal of Educational
Research, 47, 372–391. doi:10.1016/j.ijer.2009.01.001
Splitter, L. J., & Sharp, A. M. (1996). The practice of philosophy in the
classroom. In R. F. Reed & A. M. Sharp (Eds.), Studies in Philosophy for Children: Pixie (pp. 285–314). Madrid, Spain: Ediciones De La
Torre.
Stipek, D. J., Givvin, K. B., Salmon, J. M., & MacGyvers, V. L. (2001).
Teachers’ beliefs and practices related to mathematics instruction. Teaching and Teacher Education, 17, 213–226. doi:10.1016/S0742-051X(00)
00052-4
Stromso, H. I., & Braten, I. (2009). Beliefs about knowledge
and knowing and multiple-text comprehension among upper secondary students. Educational Psychology, 29, 425–445. doi:10.1080/
01443410903046864
Sugimoto, A. (1999). The effects of different styles of interaction on the
learning of evolutionary theories (Unpublished doctoral dissertation).
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
Taylor, B. M., Pearson, P. D., Peterson, D. S., & Rodriguez, M. C. (2003).
Reading growth in high-poverty classrooms: The influence of teacher
practices that encourage cognitive engagement in literacy learning. The
Elementary School Journal, 104, 3–28. doi:10.1086/499740

Toulmin, S. E. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Valanides, N., & Angeli, C. (2005). Effects of instruction on changes
in epistemological beliefs. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 30,
314–330. doi:10.1016/j.cedpsych.2005.01.001
Veenman, S., Denessen, E., Akker, A. v. d., & Rijt, J. v. d. (2005). Effects
of a cooperative learning program on the elaborations of students during
help seeking and help giving. American Educational Research Journal,
42, 115–151. doi:10.3102/00028312042001115
Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1968). Thought and language (newly revised, translated,
and edited by A. Kozulin). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1981). The genesis of higher-order mental functions. In
J. V. Wertsch (Ed.), The concept of activity in Soviet psychology (pp.
144–188). Armonk, NY: Sharpe.
Waggoner, M., Chinn, C. A., Yi, H., & Anderson, R. C. (1995). Collaborative
reasoning about stories. Language Arts, 72, 582–589.
Walsh, S. (2002). Construction or obstruction: teacher talk and learner involvement in the EFL classroom. Language Teaching Research, 6, 3–23.
doi:10.1191/1362168802lr095oa
Walton, D. (1992). Types of dialogue, dialectical shifts and fallacies. Argumentation Illuminated, 133–147.
Walton, D. (1996a). Argument structure: A pragmatic theory. Toronto,
Canada: University of Toronto Press.
Walton, D. (1996b). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning.
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Walton, D. (1998). The new dialectic: Conversational contexts of argument.
Toronto, Canada: Univeristy of Toronto Press.
Walton, D., & Macagno, F. (2007). Types of dialogue, dialectical relevance
and textual congruity. Anthropology & Philosophy: International Multidisciplinary Journal, 8, 101–119.
Webb, N. M., Franke, M. L., Ing, M., Chan, A., Battey, D., Freund, D., . . .
Shein, P. (2007, April). The role of teacher discourse in effective groupwork. Paper presented at the American Educational Research Association,
Chicago, IL.
Wegerif, R., Mercer, N., & Dawes, L. (1999). From social interaction to individual reasoning: An empirical investigation of a possible sociocultural
model of cognitive development. Learning and Instruction, 9, 493–516.
doi:10.1016/S0959-4752(99)00013-4
Weinstock, M. P. (2006). Psychological research and the epistemological
approach to argumentation. Informal Logic, 26, 103–120.
Weinstock, M. P., Neuman, Y., & Tabak, I. (2004). Missing the point or missing the norms? Epistemological norms as predictors of students’ ability
to identify fallacious arguments. Contemporary Educational Psychology,
29, 77–94. doi:10.1016/S0361-476X(03)00024-9
Wells, G. (1999). Dialogic inquiry: Toward a sociocultural practice and
theory of education. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wells, G. (2000). Dialogic inquiry in education: Building on the legacy of
Vygotsky. In C. D. Lee & P. Smagorinsky (Eds.), Vygotskian perspectives
on literacy research (pp. 51–85). New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Wertsch, J. V., & Bivens, J. A. (1992). The social origins of individual
mental functioning: Alternatives and perspectives. Quarterly Newsletter
of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 14(2), 35–44.
Wertsch, J. V., & Tulviste, P. (1992). L. S. Vygotsky and contemporary
developmental psychology. Developmental psychology, 28, 548–557.
doi:10.1037/0012-1649.28.4.548
Wilkinson, I. A. G., & Murphy, P. K. (2011, September). What we know
and need to know about the role of dialogue-intensive pedagogies in
improving reading comprehension. Paper presented at the Socializing Intelligence through Academic Talk and Dialogue, University of Pittsburgh,
PA.
Wilkinson, I. A. G., Reninger, K. B., & Soter, A. (2010). Developing a
professional development tool for assessing quality talk about text. In

STUDENT THOUGHT AND CLASSROOM LANGUAGE

R. T. Jimenez, V. J. Risko, D. W. Rowe, & M. Hundley (Eds.), 59th
Yearbook of the National Reading Conference (pp. 142–159). Oak Creek,
WI: National Reading Conference.
Windschitl, M. (2002). Framing constructivism in practice as the negotiation
of dilemmas: An analysis of the conceptual, pedagogical, cultural, and
political challenges facing teachers. Review of Educational Research, 72,
131–175. doi:10.3102/00346543072002131

133

Wolf, M., Crosson, A., & Resnick, L. (2006). Accountable talk in
reading comprehension instruction (CSE Tech. Rep. No. 670). Pittsburgh, PA: Learning and Research Development Center, University of
Pittsburgh.
Yeh, S. (1998). Empowering education: Teaching argumentative writing to
cultural minority middle-school students. Research in the Teaching of
English, 33, 49–81.

Copyright of Educational Psychologist is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be
copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

